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NOTES
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUBJECT INTERSTATE
COMMERCE TO STATE REGULATION
The federal Hawes-Cooper Act provides that all goods manufactured by
convicts and "transported into any state .... for use, consumption, sale, or
storage, shall upon arrival .... be subject to .... the laws of such state ....
as though manufactured .... in such state."' In Whitfield v. Ohio, the defend-
ant sold in the original packages convict-made shirts transported from Ala-
bama, and was fined for violation of a statute of Ohio prohibiting the sale of
such goods on the open market.' The United States Supreme Court granted
' 45 Stat. 1084 (1929), 49 U.S.C.A. § 6o (supp. 1935).
2 Ohio Gen. Code 1929, § 2228-I. The apparent discrimination in favor of goods made within
the state was prevented by a constitutional provision and statute prohibiting the sale of goods
made by convicts in Ohio. Ohio Const., art. 2, § 41; Ohio Gen. Code 1929, § 2228-1.
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certioraris The defendant contended that the state Act was an unconstitutional
regulation of interstate commerce, and that the Hawes-Cooper Act was an
attempted delegation of federal legislative power to the states. The Supreme
Court held both acts constitutional.4 Three judges concurred specially without
opinions.5
It is well settled that the states can regulate interstate commerce even with-
out federal permission in a proper case,6 i.e., in a matter not of national interest
nor requiring uniformity of treatment throughout the United States.7 The Su-
preme Court in Leisy v. Hardin8 partly settled the line between the interstate
commerce which a state can and that which it cannot regulate by declaring a
state prohibition void so far as it affected commodities from other states in
original packages.9 But the Court intimates in the Whitfield case that the "orig-
inal package" test is to be abandoned,0 and that the state prohibition might
have been valid even without the Hawes-Cooper Act. So far as this dictum
would permit state regulation of commodities in original packages it contrasts
strangely with the recent decision in Baldwinz v. Seelig', which invalidated a
state regulation of milk after it had been poured out of the original containers
into bottles. Thus the "original package" test has been found wanting on the
one side because it restricts state powers too greatly, and on the other because
it lets them extend too far. It would seem, therefore, that the doctrine has out-
lived its usefulness and is being discarded. The Court perhaps is groping, as in
the period before Leisy v. Hardin, for a new basis of separating state and federal
jurisdictions under the commerce clause.
3 The Ohio Appellate Court affirmed the conviction on the ground that the Hawes-Cooper
Act validated such regulation by the state. Whitfield v. State, 49 Ohio App. 530, 197 N. E.
6oS (i935). Petition for writ of error dismissed, 129 Ohio St. 543, i96 N. E. 164 (1935).
4 Whitfield v. Ohio, 56 Sup. Ct. 532 (i936).
s Justices VanDevanter, McReynolds, and Stone.
6 It is assumed that in case of conflict the federal regulation would prevail even in that
part of interstate commerce subject to state powers. Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 425
(i912).
7 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (U.S.) 299 (1852); Compagnie Frangaise v. Louisi-
ana State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 385 (1902); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. i6o (i9i6);
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913); see id., 369 ff. for a collection of cases applying
this rule. See Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, ante p. 556.
8 135 U.S. ioo (i89o).
9 The original package test also was applied in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. I
(1898). Cf. Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 51X (1935).
o -.... the unbroken package doctrine, as applied to interstate commerce, has come to
be regarded .... as more artificial than sound." Sutherland, J., 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 535.
Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 5o6 (1923) is cited. In that case a non-discriminatory
state tax on commodities brought into the state and resting there in original packages was
sustained, and the "original package" doctrine was discarded as a basis for testing the validity
of state taxation.
- 294 U.S. 511 (I93S). 12 See Sholley, op. cit. supra note 7, at 585.
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In spite of the suggestion that the federal act might not have been necessary,
Whitfield v. Ohio clearly holds that the Hawes-Cooper Act is valid. The opinion
declares that the Hawes-Cooper Act is essentially the same as the Wilson Act
sustained in In re Rahrer,13 which rendered intoxicating liquors subject to state
laws "enacted in the exercise of .... police powers."'4 However, there is a
difference between the acts which seems important in the light of earlier deci-
sions of the Court. The first objection to enabling acts, such as the Wilson and
Hawes-Cooper Acts has been that they delegate to the states some part of the
federal power to regulate interstate commerce.15 This objection was answered
in In re Rahrer by relying upon that part of the Wilson Act which limited the
state laws operating under it to such as were passed in the exercise of the re-
served police power.'6 Thus, the Court concluded, the federal act contemplated
only such laws as the state had reserved power to enact, and its effect was merely
negative, i.e., to take away from certain commodities the protection from state
regulation which they had previously enjoyed under the commerce clause.7
Had the state regulation in the Rahrer case been a typical "commercial regula-
tion," this analysis would not have been open to the court, and the exercise of
the state power would have been even more difficult to explain without running
afoul of the objection based upon delegation of federal powers. The state regu-
lation in the Whitfield case is a typical regulation of commerce; 8 its validity
therefore must rest upon some rationalization not employed in the Rahrer case.
But on this point there is no illumination in the opinion.
Assuming, however, that the federal power to subject interstate commerce to
state regulation exists, a natural question is whether it may be used for attack-
ing the child labor problem. It is likely that Leisy v. Hardin9 and Baldwin v.
Seelig-o stand in the way of any substantial state control of the products of
child labor. Hammer v. Dagenhart,2" on the other hand, prevents Congress from
absolutely prohibiting the transportation of such products in interstate com-
merce. Thus is created a void between state and federal powers, through which
13 14o U.S. 545 (i89i). The Wilson Act was passed to avoid the decision in Leisy v. Hardin.
X4 26 Stat. 313 (i89o), 27 U.S.C.A. § 121 (supp. 1935).
IS The objection, if meritorious, would render the federal act unconstitutional. See Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (U.S.) 299 (1852); similarly, if the act were deemed to adopt
state laws, it would be void. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
16 It has been held from an early date that the delegation to Congress of its power over
commerce did not take away the police powers of the states. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat.
(U.S.) i, 203 (1824); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 408 (1913).
'7 For a critical treatment of distinctions of this type, see Sholley, op. cit. supra note 7.
18 The act was so treated by the state court. Whitfield v. State, 49 Ohio App. 530 (1935).
Before passage of the Hawes-Cooper Act an attempt to license dealers in goods made by con-
victs in other states had been held invalid by the Ohio Supreme Court, as a regulation of inter-
state commerce. Arnold v. Yanders, 56 Ohio St. 417 (1897).
19 135 U.S. oo (18go). 20 294 U.S. 1i1 (1935). 2'247 U.S. 251 (19,8).
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the traffic in child labor products moves unmolested.Y A statute like the Hawes-
Cooper Act, but directed against the products of child labor would, if sustained,
partly fill this gap.23 In holding such an act constitutional, moreover, Hammer
v. Dagenhart need not be overruled, for the power of Congress to subject inter-
state commerce to state laws is not necessarily limited as is the power to pro-
hibit interstate commerce outright.24 The latter power is asserted directly
against the goods prohibited. The former merely removes a shield, and permits
the state power to act. Different considerations of policy may govern where
one power is used, rather than the other.25 It is significant that the state power,
when permitted to take effect, seems broader in scope than the federal power to
prohibit. This difference is illustrated by the contrast between Whitfield v. Ohio
and Hammer v. DagenhIart. In the Whitfield case the tendency of convict-made
goods to lower wages and create bad competitive conditions was held a proper
ground for exercising the state's power to regulate.26 In the Hammer case it was
held that the same tendency of child-made goods would not justify a federal
prohibition.27 It is thus possible that Congress will be permitted to subject
commodities to state regulation when a federal prohibition would be stricken
down.
It is probable, however, that the line of cases establishing and limiting the
power of Congress tb prohibit interstate commerce would have an important
bearing on the ultimate result of cooperative federal and state legislation di-
rected against child-made goods. Federal prohibitions and acts subjecting com-
modities to state laws have been sustained which dealt with things immediately
-Corwin, The Power of Congress to Prohibit Commerce, i8 Cornell L. Q. 477 (1933). The
dictun in Whitfield v. Ohio stating that the local statute might have been valid without the
Hawes-Cooper Act, may be construed to mean that a state prohibition of child labor products
would be upheld, especially because the evil which is urged against them, i.e., their bad effect
upon competitors using adult labor, furnished the ground for upholding the probibition of
convict-made goods. See 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 535. But in view of the recent decision in Baldwin v.
Seelig, such a result seems unlikely.
23 See 49 Harv. L. Rev. 466 (x936).
24 "If the power of Congress to remove the impediment to state control presented by the
unbroken package doctrine be limited in any way (a question which we do not find it necessary
to consider) ..... " Sutherland, J., 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 535.
At least one court does not think it inconsistent to limit the power to prohibit completely
without similarly limiting the power to subject goods to state control. In Kentucky Whip &
Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 12 F. Supp. 37 (Ky. 1935), the court, in a dictum, declared
unconstitutional that part of the federal Ashurst-Sunners Law which prohibits the trans-
portation of convict-made goods into a state for use against the laws of such state. In the same
opinion the decisions of the state courts in Whitfield v. Ohio, sustaining the Hawes-Cooper
Act, are cited with approval. 12 F. Supp. 37, 42.
2S See p. 640 infra.
26 56 Sup. Ct. 532, 535. The bad competitive effect of convict-made goods is the basis of
the federal and state legislation. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 6-io.
27 247 U.S. 251, 273.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
harmful to the user, such as adulterated foods,'2 or instruments of fraud, such
as stolen cars29 and misbranded articles,3o or with a comparatively insignificant
traffic, such as convict-made goods.3' Hammer v. Dagenhart, however, limited
the power to prohibit in two ways: first by distinguishing the former cases
sustaining federal prohibitions on the ground that they affected things harmful
in themselves and producing harmful consequences at their destination;32 sec-
ond, by declaring that the power could not be used to subject local industries,
not themselves interstate commerce, to federal regulation. The requirement
that the articles prohibited be harmful in themselves is avoided by cooperative
legislation through the distinction pointed out above, i.e., the broader scope of
the state power when it is permitted to act. The second objection, that state
power will be destroyed by federal prohibitions based upon local manufacturing
conditions, vanishes when the cooperative method is used. Federal enabling
acts recognize and rely upon the individual states. No state could join in de-
stroying the interstate market until it had adopted for its own industries such
regulations as it demanded of others, for discriminatory state measures would
be struck down. 3 A substantial number of states would have to adopt pro-
hibitory measures for themselves before a serious effect on the interstate market
could be produced. The decision may supply a means, so far as constitutional
theory can do so, of dealing with child labor without constitutional amendment.
THE VALIDITY OF STOCKHOLDERS' VOTING
AGREEMENTS IN ILLINOIS
Modern corporate financing frequently requires the creation of a united ma-
jority of stockholders, by a contract or trust, which will successfully resist both
the attack of the original parties to the undertaking and the objections raised
by transferees of the affected shares. The necessity of making binding agree-
ments among stockholders arises upon the creation, the reorganization, or the
winding up of a corporation; or in the securing of loans made to the corporation;
281Hipolite Egg Co. v. U.S., 220 U.S. 45 (i9i1). Perhaps intoxicating liquors (Clark Dis-
tilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (I917); U.S. v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (IgIg))
and prostitutes (Hoke v. U.S., 227 U.S. 308 (i903)) can also be included in this class.
29 Brooks v. U.S., 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
3o Seven Cases v. U.S., 239 U.S. 51o (i916); Weeks v. U.S., 245 U.S. 618 (i9x8).
31 Whitfield v. Ohio, 56 Sup. Ct. 532 (1936).
32The requirement that goods prohibited from interstate commerce by federal law be
harmful in themselves was first used as a description, in supporting decisions sustaining the
power to prohibit. The Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). In Clark Distilling Co. v. Western
Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917), the prohibition was sustained on the ground of the "excep-
tional" nature of the prohibited commodity-intoxicating liquor. In Hammer v. Dagenhart
the harmful or exceptional nature of the commodities involved in the earlier cases became a
basis for distinguishing them and so a limitation upon the federal power to prohibit.
33 Welton v. Missouri, 9x U.S. 275 (z876); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886).
